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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN RISK REGULATION:  
THE FLAWS OF FORMALITY 
 
Emily Hammond* 
 
Dread risks draw significant public attention in both the 
administrative process and the courts. Yet there are a number of 
dysfunctions at the intersection of procedures, participation, and agency 
decision-making regarding such risks. This Article elaborates the 
participatory dysfunctions for dread risk regulation, considering formal 
APA procedures as well as casting complexity as a variety of formality. 
Inspired by recent executive actions for improving participation and 
incorporating social science insights into the regulatory process, this 
Article sets a research agenda that spans the fields of risk perception, 
procedural justice, and administrative law. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Calls for trimming down the administrative state enjoy enduring popularity. But 
some risks are sufficiently worrisome that all but the staunchest advocates of limited 
government admit a desire for some regulation. Dread risks—those that seem 
inequitable, uncontrollable, involuntary, and catastrophic1—are indeed regulated 
within some of the most formal and complex of administrative frameworks. 
Furthermore, they attract significant public2 stakeholder attention throughout the 
administrative process as well as in the courts. 
We might expect that these are the types of risks most likely to involve (a) 
regulatory structures designed to foster such engagement; and (b) highly motivated, 
vocal public stakeholders who actually participate.3 Regarding point (a), it turns out 
                                                 
* © 2016 Emily Hammond. Associate Dean for Public Engagement and Professor of 
Law, The George Washington University Law School. For their helpful comments on earlier 
versions of this Article, I thank Robin Kundis Craig and Arden Rowell. This Article is being 
published in connection with the S.J. Quinney School of Law Young Scholar Lecture. The 
author thanks all of the students and faculty at the S.J. Quinney College of Law, University 
of Utah for their warm welcome.  
1 See Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 283 (1987) (defining “dread 
risk”).  
2 There are any number of potential stakeholders in agency proceedings—regulated 
industries, government officials, relevant experts, and the like. Here I focus on “the public.” 
See Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking vs. Democracy: Judging and Nudging Public 
Participation That Counts, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 123, 145 (2012) (adopting this 
approach). 
3 Such public participation thereby avoids, or at least dampens, industry capture. Cf. 
Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic 
Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 107, 123 (2011) (noting that high public 
participation is less likely where issues are not obviously salient to those who stand to be 
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that statutory mandates do not necessarily reflect a congressional design for 
heightened participation. 4  Regarding point (b), public stakeholders do often 
participate, and often push for stricter procedures—but such engagement can cause 
“extensive delay and escalating costs”5 for the acting agency while still leaving 
stakeholders dissatisfied.6 In other words, there are a number of dysfunctions at the 
intersection of procedures, participation, and agency decision-making. And when 
dread risks are at issue, the stakes—often involving public health and safety, the 
environment, and potentially beneficial but risky technologies—can be quite high.  
Participation is a steadfast norm of administrative law. The Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) itself includes participation in both informal rulemaking and 
formal decision-making procedures.7 Moreover, scholars, courts, and policymakers 
have given sustained attention to the topic.8 But the administrative law literature 
often reflects disappointing results; sometimes rates of participation are quite low, 
and it is hard to determine whether participation matters.9 On the other hand, many 
agree that public stakeholders find other ways—usually through political avenues or 
                                                 
impacted, and documenting high incidence of industry input into Hazardous Air Pollutants 
rulemakings). 
4 See infra Part III.  
5 Judith Bradbury & Steve Rayner, Reconciling the Irreconcilable, in IMPLEMENTING 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT AND PARTICIPATORY DECISION-
MAKING PROCESSES 15, 22 (Hussein Abaza & Andrea Baranzini eds., 2002); see Peter S. 
Adler & Kristi Parker Celico, Policy Dialogue, BEYOND INTRACTABILITY (Dec. 2003), 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/ 
policy-dialogue [http://perma.cc/9GWF-SRBY] (discussing the stakeholder engagement 
process for chemical weapons disposal that resulted in full consensus and avoided litigation).  
6 The long saga of the Yucca Mountain Project provides a strong example. See Emily 
Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma, 61 DUKE 
L.J. 1763, 1784–86 (2012) (providing details on the extensive delays for the Yucca Mountain 
Project) [hereinafter Hammond, Deference Dilemma].  
7 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (“[T]he agency shall give interested persons an opportunity 
to participate. . . .”); id. § 554(c) (setting forth opportunities for interested parties to 
participate).  
8 See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 411, 412 (2005) (presenting results of empirical study that demonstrates some 
usefulness of public comments); Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and 
Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1423 (2011) (considering ways to structure 
institutions to maximize information acquisition while minimizing costs of using that 
information); Wagner et al., supra note 3, at 103 (presenting results of empirical study that 
reveals the heavy influence of regulated industries in development of air toxic emission 
standards). 
9 See Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1345–46 (2011) (documenting instances of “agency 
officials . . . discounting . . . value-laden comments, even when [the comments] are 
numerous”); see also Farina, supra note 2, at 145 (proposing metrics for meaningful public 
participation).  
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litigation—to make an impact.10  Overall, administrative law struggles to create 
meaningful participatory opportunities to improve agency decision-making. 
The need for effective participation is recognized far beyond the administrative 
law literature. Studies of procedural justice, for example, illustrate that participation 
is critical to public acceptance of government decision-making.11 The risk literature 
also hints at the importance of participation.12 And the Obama administration has 
made open, accessible government a key policy initiative, which has resulted in, 
among other things, an open-source U.S. Public Participation Playbook designed to 
help government managers improve participation programs.13  
Indeed, the push for improved participation is converging with a trend among 
scholars and policymakers emphasizing that our understanding of behavioral 
sciences should inform the design and implementation of risk regulation.14  For 
example, President Obama’s recently issued Executive Order on the topic instructs 
agencies to consider how behavioral science insights can further the public welfare.15 
The aim of this Article is to respond to these trends and suggest an area in need of 
deeper exploration: the relationship between dread risks, administrative procedure, 
and participatory norms.16  
                                                 
10 Hammond, Deference Dilemma, supra note 6, at 1782 (documenting the failure of 
the Yucca Mountain Project); Wagner et al., supra note 3, at 146 (noting that public interest 
groups often find litigation more cost-effective than participation at the agency).  
11 See infra text accompanying notes 66–67. 
12 See infra text accompanying notes 58–64. 
13  U.S. PUB. PARTICIPATION PLAYBOOK, https://participation.usa.gov 
[https://perma.cc/WB26-T6CR] (last visited Jan. 4, 2016). As Professor Farina eloquently 
explains, however, more participation does not mean better participation. Farina et al., supra 
note 2, at 145. This Article seeks both. 
14 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE 
RISK REGULATION 3 (1993); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 10 (2002); Emily Hammond, Nuclear Power, Risk, and Retroactivity, 48 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1059, 1064–71 (2015); Amanda Leiter, The Perils of a Half-Built 
Bridge: Risk Perception, Shifting Majorities, and the Nuclear Power Debate, 35 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 31, 34–35 (2008); Arden Rowell, The Cost of Time: Haphazard Discounting and the 
Undervaluation of Regulatory Benefits, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1505, 1509–10 (2010); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1110, 1114 (2006) [hereinafter 
Sunstein, Misfearing]; Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is 
Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1177–78 (2003) [hereinafter Sunstein & Thaler, 
Libertarian Paternalism]; Dan M. Kahan et. al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation 
of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1075 (2006) (book review). 
15 Exec. Order No. 13,707, 80 Fed. Reg. 181 (Sept. 15, 2015). Prior to issuing the Order, 
President Obama convened a Social and Behavioral Sciences Team (SBST) to facilitate such 
activities. 
16  The risk perception literature goes far beyond Slovic’s psychometric paradigm, 
outlined supra note 1. But I focus on such risks for expediency: their characteristics map 
well onto substantive statutory schemes. See Sunstein, Misfearing, supra note 14, at 1123 
(“It is sensible to place a special emphasis on risks that are irreversible or potentially 
catastrophic.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 
842–48 (2006) (for further complexity). 
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As suggested above, the procedural aspects of regulatory schemes for dread 
risks are marked by a number of features that actually undermine the traditional 
administrative-law goals of participation, 17  deliberation, 18  and accountability. 19 
Statutory beneficiaries 20  often press for heightened procedural formality, but 
ironically, those procedures limit the available mechanisms for stakeholder 
engagement. 21  Shared, overlapping, or duplicative regulatory responsibilities 
likewise impose costs on would-be participants in the decision-making process.22 
                                                 
17 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
18  See Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for 
Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 212 (1997) (“While 
participation encourages breadth in the agency decision-making process, deliberation is more 
concerned with depth.”). 
19 The most familiar mechanism for holding agencies accountable is judicial review. 
See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1749, 1751 (2007) (“[T]he Court may enforce administrative procedures in order to 
help ensure that agency decisions track dominant legislative preferences.”); Peter L. Strauss, 
Legislation That Isn’t—Attending to Rulemaking’s “Democracy Deficit,” 98 CALIF. L. REV. 
1351, 1357 (2010) (“The legitimacy of delegated discretionary authority, that is, is tied 
directly to the possibility of judicial review for the rationality of its exercise.”); see also 
Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 1000 
(2007) (“[P]art of the tradeoff for Congress’s choice to delegate authority is that the recipient 
of that power must be more articulate about the grounds for its action than Congress would 
be.”). But oversight by Congress, the President, and other stakeholders also plays an 
important role in accountability. See Bressman, supra, at 1768–69 (describing positive 
political theory’s view of administrative procedure as a tool for legislative oversight); 
McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 180, 185 (1999) (“In practice, Congress and the president possess several tools to 
influence ongoing agency operations.”); Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the 
Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 733, 778–79 (2011) (suggesting that hard-look review of agency science can reinforce 
these norms [hereinafter Hammond, Super Deference]); Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing 
“Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1131–33 (2010) 
(explaining the President’s authority to be involved in rulemaking). Further, agencies 
frequently exhibit participation-reinforcing behavior even in the absence of judicial review. 
E.g., Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review: 
Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 316–20 (2013) 
(reporting results of empirical study).  
20 I refer here to stakeholders that benefit from the public-interest aspects of the relevant 
statutory scheme, and who would typically seek greater protection from risks than the 
stakeholders within the regulated industry. 
21 See infra Part IV. 
22 For insightful discussions of such schemes, see generally Eric Biber, Too Many 
Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 4, 62 (2009) (noting that multiple-goal agencies struggle to balance 
competing interests and proposing solutions); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency 
Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1209 (2012) 
(recommending that the executive branch promote stronger interagency coordination in order 
to alleviate the problem of overlapping responsibilities in administrative agencies). 
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Given that dread risks are measured and managed using expertise, judgment, and 
policy, accountability through judicial review is weakened by the prevalence of 
extreme deference. 23  This is compounded by the harmless error standard that 
governs judicial review of procedural errors. 24  And many of these regulatory 
schemes also displace or remove a potential risk management mechanism from the 
toolbox because they frequently preempt state tort law.25 In considering these issues, 
one reaction might be to note that when risk opponents push for more procedures, 
their motivation is to cause delay—not to be able to have more productive 
conversations with an agency. And even if there were more avenues for public 
engagement, a fundamental question of administrative law is whether participation 
even matters.26 Despite these very realistic concerns, I contend that we can improve. 
An occasional example shows it is possible: Sometimes, an agency’s difficult risk 
management decision-making productively incorporates stakeholder involvement 
and results in effective risk management strategies.27  Such examples provide a 
counterpoint to the typical narrative, which emphasizes that risk perceptions matter 
because they can result in costly overregulation and occasionally even disrupt entire 
statutory schemes.28 Overall, then, the hope is that more efforts can be directed at 
                                                 
23 See Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) 
(“[A] reviewing court must remember that the Commission is making predictions, within its 
area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science. When examining this kind of scientific 
determination, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be at 
its most deferential.”); see also Hammond, Super Deference, supra note 19, at 756–78 
(examining the practice of super deference). 
24 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (“[D]ue account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.”). 
25  See William W. Buzbee, Interaction’s Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk 
Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145, 151 n.14 (2007) (“[A]ll will 
fail to act based on the hope that others will accept a needed but noxious facility. This is 
perhaps the most justifiable rationale for the shift of [Liquid Natural Gas] siting authority to 
[the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission].”).  
26 See Cuéllar, supra note 8, at 414–15; Mendelson, supra note 9, at 1346 (noting the 
current system is such that agencies pay attention to technical and scientific comments far 
more than value-driven or policy comments); Wagner et al., supra note 3, at 102, 106–09; 
Stephenson, supra note 8, at 1437–38. 
27 One of the best-known examples is the story of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in 
Carlsbad, New Mexico, which is the world’s only operating underground nuclear waste 
repository. See Hazardous Waste Facility Permit Community Relations Plan, WASTE 
ISOLATION PILOT PLANT, http://www.wipp.energy.gov/WIPPCommunity 
Relations/index.html [http://perma.cc/5YSK-W7ZQ] (last visited Nov. 13, 2015). 
28 Hammond, Deference Dilemma, supra note 6, at 1782–90; see also Joel B. Eisen & 
Emily Hammond, Linking Legal Framework Design and Risk Theory to Consumer 
Acceptance of the Smart Grid, in THE INTERNATIONAL SMART GRID CONFERENCE 
(forthcoming 2016) (on file with the Utah Law Review) (describing public efforts to block 
smart meter installation and related perceived risks). 
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what Professor Kahan has called “reconcil[ing] democracy with a rational response 
to public fears.”29  
This Article begins Part II by setting the stage with a brief overview of some of 
the risk perception literature, which demonstrates why dread risks can pose 
particular challenges for administrative procedure. That same literature, however, 
hints at the potential effectiveness of more careful procedural design for furthering 
meaningful participation. Given that public beneficiary stakeholders typically seek 
formal procedures, Part III considers formal procedures under sections 556 and 557 
of the APA and critiques the usefulness of those procedures in promoting 
participation. Part IV turns to complex statutory schemes of shared or overlapping 
jurisdiction, and argues that such schemes share some of the same benefits and 
drawbacks of formality. As I argue, even though these schemes seem on the surface 
to provide opportunities for public engagement, for a variety of reasons they lack 
effectiveness as a practical matter. And administrative law doctrine—that is, judicial 
review—itself insufficiently values participatory goals.30  Part V sets a research 
agenda that spans the risk perception, procedural justice, and administrative law 
domains. My hope is to suggest ways forward for better incorporating public 
engagement into risk regulatory decision-making.  
 
II.  DREAD RISKS AND THE LAW AS AN EXPRESSION OF RISK PERCEPTION 
 
As introduced above, “dread risks” have special characteristics. Paul Slovic’s 
psychometric paradigm provides a helpful way of thinking about such risks, using 
two variables.31 The first variable represents the extent to which a risk is dreaded—
that is, “catastrophic, hard to prevent, fatal, inequitable, threatening to future 
generations, not easily reduced, increasing, involuntary, and [personally] 
threatening.”32 The second variable relates to the familiarity of a risk—that is, its 
“observability, knowledge, immediacy of consequences, and familiarity.” 33 
Examples of the high-dread, low-familiarity risks are nuclear power, nuclear waste 
disposal, uranium mining, liquefied natural gas, pollution associated with burning 
                                                 
29 Kahan et al., supra note 14, at 1106. 
30 The focus here is on procedure, rather than the substantive policy decisions an agency 
makes. The ability of judicial review to transparently account for risk perceptions is very 
limited. Those seeking an enhanced ability for courts to enforce a closer look at risk 
perception themselves risk the hydra of judicial policy cloaked in science. See Donald 
Kennedy, Prologue, in RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE 
DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH, at xix, xix–xxiii (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor 
eds., 2006); Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense: Natural Resource Management in the 
Bush Administration, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 251–53 (2005); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science 
Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1617 (1995). 
31 Slovic, supra note 1, at 281. 
32  Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff & Sarah Lichtenstein, Facts and Fears: 
Understanding Perceived Risk, in SOCIETAL RISK ASSESSMENT: HOW SAFE IS SAFE 
ENOUGH? 181, 199 (Richard C. Schwing & Walter A. Albers, Jr. eds., 1980). 
33 Id. 
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coal, DNA technology, and satellite crashes. 34  Examples of low-dread, high-
familiarity risks are bicycles, shock from electric appliances, recreational boating, 
chainsaws, and trampolines.35 As one might expect, the higher a risk is on the dread 
and unfamiliarity scales, the more people tend to want strict regulation in hopes of 
reducing the risk.36  
Certainly not everyone perceives even high-dread risks in the same way. 
Cultural cognition theory (CCT) hypothesizes that individuals perceive risks in ways 
that reflect and reinforce their cultural worldviews—whether they are individualists, 
egalitarians, hierarchs, or fatalists.37 Take geographic variations in risk perception. 
France, for example, is far more accepting of nuclear power than the United States.38 
French people, however, are more likely to hold hierarchical worldviews than 
individualistic Americans. 39  Thus, they are both more accepting of the risks 
associated with nuclear power, and more comfortable with the ability of elite experts 
to manage those risks.40  
This line of literature also helps understand why risk regulation is the focal 
point for such intense public debates, marked by deep divisions within the public. In 
essence, CCT sets forth a theory of social control. Not only does each category 
represent a different form of power in terms of who makes decisions,41 each category 
pushes for regulation that reflects its own values of what is an ideal society.42 
Furthermore, this line of research supports the conclusion that merely educating the 
public will not lead to enlightened public opinions about risk.43 Instead, people are 
more likely to further entrench their views when confronted with new information 
that is inconsistent with their cultural predispositions.44 
                                                 
34 Slovic, supra note 1, at 280. 
35 Id.  
36 Id. at 282–83. For ease of reference, I refer to high-dread, low-familiarity risks as 
simply “high-dread” or “dread” risks. 
37  Kahan et al., supra note 14, at 1090. Pioneered by Mary Douglas and Aaron 
Wildavsky, early research grouped individuals into categories reflecting these worldviews, 
and linked group membership to perceptions of risk. MARY DOUGLAS & AARON 
WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 7 (1982); see also Kahan et al., supra note 14, at 1083–87 
(providing an overview of CCT and supporting evidence).  
38 Paul Slovic et al., Nuclear Power and the Public: A Comparative Study of Risk 
Perception in France and the United States, in CROSS-CULTURAL RISK PERCEPTION: A 
SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 55, 84–99 (Ortwin Renn & Bernd Rohrmann eds., 2000); 
see also Kahan et al., supra note 14, at 1091 (discussing this study). 
39 Slovic et al., supra note 38, at 93–94. 
40 Id. at 87–90, 93–94, 98. 
41 DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, supra note 37, at 6–7. 
42 Kahan et al., supra note 14, at 1095–96. 
43 Dan M. Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of the Risks and Benefits of Nanotechnology, 
4 NATURE NANOTECHNOLOGY 87, 89 (2009) [hereinafter Kahan et al., Risks and Benefits]. 
44 Dan M. Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus, 14 J. RISK RES. 147, 
175–79 (2011) [hereinafter Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus]. 
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Examples abound. Several scholars, for example, have documented why many 
people’s perceptions of climate change deviate from the risks understood by 
scientific consensus.45 Others have noted the risk perception considerations relevant 
to hydraulic fracturing,46 smart meters,47 liquefied natural gas,48 wind energy,49 and 
spent nuclear fuel.50 More than a collection of examples, in each of these domains 
and in many others, risk perception matters. For example, some jurisdictions have 
banned hydraulic fracturing,51 others have banned smart meter installations,52 and 
the entire statutory scheme for spent nuclear fuel disposal has been ground to a halt.53 
To be sure, numerous other risk perception mechanisms are at play, and I do 
not attempt to comprehensively document them here.54 Focusing on “dread risks” 
and keeping these other attributes of the risk literature in mind are conveniences that 
make the issues considered in this Article more tractable. Indeed, the more important 
point is to see what these observations suggest about regulatory policy. First, we 
might conceive of statutes as expressions of the majority view of which risks are 
sufficiently worrisome to justify imposing legal constraints. Observe that statutes 
are frequently crafted to apply to particular risk domains: nuclear power, liquefied 
natural gas, chemical weapons incineration, and air pollution. Regulations can also 
be understood this way, notwithstanding that they are promulgated differently than 
legislation.55 Particularly for high-dread risks, one prominent concern is that such 
perceptions lead to inefficient levels of regulation.56  
                                                 
45 Id.; see also Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism 
and Climate Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 507–09 (2007).  
46  David B. Spence, Backyard Politics, National Policies: Understanding the 
Opportunity Costs of National Fracking Bans, 30 YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE 30, 30 (2013). 
47 Eisen & Hammond, supra note 28. 
48 Richard A. Clarke, LNG Facilities in Urban Areas: A Security Risk Management 
Analysis, reprinted in FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 552–53 (3d ed. 2010). 
49 Alexa Burt Engelman, Against the Wind: Conflict over Wind Energy Siting, 41 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,549, 10,552 (2011) (describing “wind turbine syndrome” and the lack of 
scientific support). 
50 Hammond, supra note 14, at 1064.  
51 JOEL B. EISEN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 196–201 (4th ed. 2015) (describing local regulation as well as bans on hydraulic 
fracturing). 
52 Eisen & Hammond, supra note 28. 
53 See Hammond, Deference Dilemma, supra note 6, at 1782–89. 
54  For further reading, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 1–9 (2005) (discussing risk theory and the relationship between 
fear and democracy); Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the 
Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141, 178–83 (2016) (further discussion of risk theory). For 
a critique of CCT, see Sunstein, Misfearing, supra note 14, at 1111–12.  
55 For this reason, an agency’s democratic legitimacy—obtained in part through the 
participatory process—is all the more important.  
56 Hammond, supra note 14, at 1066–67. 
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At one time, scholars suggested that agency expertise could combat this 
tendency, particularly when combined with cost-benefit analysis.57 But this leads to 
the second observation. Notwithstanding administrative law’s long tradition of 
putting agency expertise on a pedestal,58 relying on scientific and technical experts 
to overcome risk perception biases is not a useful solution. Both the administrative 
law literature59 and the risk literature reject that experts are more rational, or more 
able to objectively assess risks than the broader public.60 Experts, as it turns out, are 
really no different than lay persons: “Like members of the general public, experts 
are inclined to form attitudes toward risk that best express their cultural vision.”61 
Certainly societal risks like toxic waste and nuclear power necessarily require 
reliance on expert regulators.62 But doing so does not temper the power of risk 
perception—nor does it necessarily lead to meaningful participation.  
The third point, then, is that much of the risk literature suggests—but does not 
really explore—that procedural solutions may be useful for promoting meaningful 
participation, dialogue, and ultimately, decision-making. How the information is 
framed, for example, can “guide risk communication and thus enhance democratic 
deliberations on risk-regulation policy.” 63  When communications affirm the 
recipient’s cultural worldview, the recipient is more likely to be receptive to 
information that might initially trigger resistance.64 Further, what many people resist 
is not the possibility of a risk itself, but the presentation of a risk with a potential 
mechanism for managing that risk, as though the two are inextricably tied.65 Thus, 
                                                 
57 E.g., BREYER, supra note 14, at 21–29. 
58 For an account, see Hammond, Super Deference, supra note 19, at 756–64. 
59 See id. at 736 nn. 9–10; Katherine A. Trisolini, Decisions, Disasters, and Deference: 
Rethinking Agency Expertise After Fukushima, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 323, 337 (2015) 
(critiquing agency expertise); Wagner, supra note 30, at 1628 (expressing concerns that 
scientists blur the lines between science and policy). 
60  See Carol L. Silva & Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, The Precautionary Principle in 
Context: U.S. and E.U. Scientists’ Prescriptions for Policy in the Face of Uncertainty, 88 
SOC. SCI. Q. 640, 654–65 (2007). But see generally BREYER, supra note 14, at 33–35 
(suggesting experts can be better insulated from distortions of public risk perceptions); Lucia 
Savadori et al., Expert and Public Perception of Risk from Biotechnology, in THE FEELING 
OF RISK: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON RISK PERCEPTION 245, 246–47 (Paul Slovic ed., 2010) 
(presenting a study in which experts rated risks from both food and medical biotechnology 
as lower than members of the public, though dread was an important factor for all subjects). 
61 Kahan et al., supra note 14, at 1094; see also Bradbury & Rayner, supra note 5, at 
22 (noting “the limitations and resulting problems of overreliance on technical analysis in 
disputes with a social basis”).  
62 Kahan et al., supra note 14, at 1104. 
63 Kahan et al., Risks and Benefits, supra note 43, at 89; accord. Kahan et al., supra 
note 14, at 1101–04 (considering how deliberation can account for cultural cognition and 
enhance decisionmaking).  
64 Kahan et al., supra note 14, at 1097. 
65 My co-teacher, Hank Jenkins-Smith, and I have called this the Al Gore effect, in 
reference to the backlash caused by An Inconvenient Truth. See generally AL GORE, AN 
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individualists might prefer nuclear power over coal if they are presented with a 
market-based solution to managing spent fuel, while egalitarians might be more 
accepting of nuclear power if they see it as reducing greenhouse gas emissions as 
compared with coal. 66  Of interest, these suggestions are consistent with the 
procedural justice literature, which supports the propositions that voice, neutrality, 
fairness, and trustworthiness promote acceptance of outcomes.67  
 
III.  FORMALITY AND PARTICIPATION 
 
But what kinds of procedures are most effective? A common approach for those 
who seek more stringent regulation of dread risks is to press for formal procedures, 
as contemplated by sections 556 and 557 of the APA. Thus, this Part begins by 
briefly describing two mechanisms for achieving APA formality: a blanket 
prescription; and a summary-judgment-type trigger. Regardless of which 
mechanism is at play, relevant doctrine errs on the side of less formality. This Part 
next argues that in any event, an emphasis on formal procedures is misplaced for 
those truly seeking meaningful participation because such procedures tend instead 
to undermine participatory norms.   
 
A.  APA Formality 
 
The term “formal proceeding” traditionally refers to agency actions that must 
take place according to the procedures set forth in sections 556 and 557 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act. To determine whether those sections apply, one must 
consult the organic statute to see whether it requires the proceeding to be “on the 
record after an opportunity for an agency hearing.”68 Although it may be difficult to 
predict precisely whether formal procedures apply in a given situation, the general 
approach has been to favor informal, rather than formal proceedings69—an approach 
                                                 
INCONVENIENT TRUTH: THE PLANETARY EMERGENCY OF GLOBAL WARMING AND WHAT WE 
CAN DO ABOUT IT (2006) (warning about the impact of global warming).  
66 See Kahan et al., supra note 14, at 1098 (providing other examples). 
67 See Hammond & Markell, supra note 19, at 317, 317 n.19 (describing procedural 
justice and collecting sources). 
68 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (rulemaking); id. § 554(a) (adjudications). 
69 This is certainly true for rulemaking proceedings, where trial-type proceedings seem 
ill-fitted to developing legislative facts. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 
406 U.S. 742, 757–58 (1972) (refusing to read the word “hearing” into the Esch Act to trigger 
formal procedures where there was no provision requiring the hearing to take place on the 
record); see also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 
519, 524 (1978) (courts may not impose additional procedures on agencies beyond those 
required by the organic statute and the APA); Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems 
of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–23 (1942) (explaining 
that adjudicative procedures are usually not necessary to resolve the types of factual issues 
that are germane to rulemaking). For adjudications, however, courts have split as to the 
appropriate mode of analysis for determining whether formal proceedings are required. 
Compare Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1480–83 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
2016] PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN RISK REGULATION 179 
criticized recently by Justice Thomas.70 Typically, an organic statute that uses the 
magic words “hearing on the record” is taken to require formal proceedings; 
otherwise, Congress must have made its intent for formality clear in some other 
way.71  
As noted in Part I, dread risks typically enjoy the greatest public support for 
regulation. But this does not mean that a risk’s dread factor is a useful variable for 
predicting whether a statute provides for formal procedures. 72  In fact, formal 
rulemaking is almost never specified,73 and formal adjudication is largely confined 
to certain subsets of cases involving, for example, civil penalties.74 As scholars have 
                                                 
(applying Chevron deference to EPA’s interpretation of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act to mean that formal procedures were not required), and City of West Chicago 
v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 701 F.2d 632, 645 (7th Cir. 1983) (erecting a 
presumption against formality where the statute does not provide for both a hearing and a 
record), with Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 877 (1st Cir. 1978), 
overruled by Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 
2006) (applying a presumption in favor of formality where hearing and judicial review are 
required). See generally William S. Jordan, III, Chevron and Hearing Rights: An Unintended 
Combination, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 249 (2009) (criticizing the use of Chevron to resolve this 
issue). 
70 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1222 n.5 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“[F]ormal rulemaking is the Yeti of administrative law.”). He seemed to argue 
that the Court has failed to require agencies to comply with mandatory procedures. Id. This 
observation was not directly on point; the case involved the procedures required of an agency 
that changed its interpretive rule without undertaking notice-and-comment. Id. at 1203 
(majority opinion). 
71 City of West Chicago, 701 F.2d at 641. 
72 Cf. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2243(b)(1) (2012) (providing for formal 
hearings on licenses for privately owned and operated uranium enrichment facilities). 
73 An important exception is some rulemaking at the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA). See Lisa Heinzerling, Undue Process at the FDA: Antibiotics, Animal Feed, and 
Agency Intransigence, 37 VT. L. REV. 1007, 1021 (2013) (listing decisions for which formal 
rulemakings are required); Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure 
Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 107 (2003) (describing “notorious” example 
involving the peanut content of peanut butter). For an argument in defense of formal 
rulemaking, see generally Aaron L. Nielson, In Defense of Formal Rulemaking, 75 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 237 (2014) (arguing that formal rulemaking will facilitate better rules of greater 
legitimacy).  
74 See Gary J. Edles, An APA-Default Presumption for Administrative Hearings: Some 
Thoughts on “Ossifying” the Adjudication Process, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 787, 795 (2003) 
(“[O]ver 200 civil penalty statutes are based on the formal APA model developed by the 
Administrative Conference.”). Note that Social Security benefit adjudications, which are 
presided over by Administrative Law Judges, are governed by a statute that predates the 
APA. See id. at 809 (describing the history of procedures under the Social Security Act of 
1935). In addition, immigration cases “illustrate a formal adjudicatory model that has clearly 
developed wholly outside an APA framework.” Id. at 810 (describing Congress’s reversal of 
an early Supreme Court case that had held such cases were within the formal APA 
framework). 
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observed more broadly, there appears to be neither rhyme nor reason to Congress’s 
assignment of formal procedures to agency actions.75 For example, in the nuclear 
waste context, Congress mandated formal procedures for licensing the Yucca 
Mountain Project, but the rest of the process was to be governed by informal 
requirements. 76  The licensing agency—the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC)—at the time used formal procedures for licensing nuclear power plants.77 
Perhaps Congress used the formal “magic words” simply because it expected NRC 
to continue its then-current practices, but NRC itself later reduced the formality of 
its power plant licensing procedures, as I describe momentarily.  
Thus far, the discussion has considered statutory formality requirements that 
operate as blanket prescriptions for formal procedures. Occasionally, however, a 
statute or agency rule will provide a triggering mechanism for formal proceedings. 
This avenue to formal proceedings, which I term the “summary judgment trigger” 
approach, provides that a formal, on-the-record proceeding is required only in 
certain circumstances. For example, in connection with licensing proceedings, the 
Deepwater Port Act provides that “if the Secretary determines that there exists one 
or more specific and material factual issues which may be resolved by a formal 
evidentiary hearing, at least one adjudicatory hearing shall be held in accordance” 
with APA’s formal procedures.78 Just as doctrine for blanket prescriptions defaults 
to informality, summary judgment triggers tend to do the same:  courts considering 
whether formal provisions are triggered have generally been deferential to agencies’ 
determinations that such procedures are not necessary.79  
The overwhelming lesson is that although public interest groups have pushed 
for heightened formality, courts consistently rebuff such efforts. Before turning to 
the normative implications, a concrete example is helpful. For nuclear power plant 
licensing, the Atomic Energy Act provides that NRC must hold a hearing “upon the 
                                                 
75 WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE: PROBLEMS 
AND CASES 195 (5th ed. 2014). 
76 Hammond, Deference Dilemma, supra note 6, at 1805. 
77 See Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. United States, 391 F.3d 338, 348 (1st Cir. 
2004) (applying Chevron deference to, and upholding, NRC’s decision to stop using APA 
formal procedures for nuclear power plant licensing). 
78 33 U.S.C. § 1504(g) (2012). 
79 Wisconsin v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 104 F.3d 462, 467–68 (D.C. Cir. 
1997) (finding that for hydroelectric licenses, formal proceedings are triggered only if written 
materials would be insufficient and concluding that the trigger was not met); S. Union Gas 
Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 840 F.2d 964, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that the 
trigger is met where genuine issues of material fact exist and concluding that this trigger was 
not met where the petitioner challenged the agency’s denial of its request to investigate the 
reasonableness of the gas curtailment plan arising from settlement). Notably, courts have 
also been willing to permit agencies to limit the circumstances in which hearings would be 
permitted. See United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192, 202–03 (1956) (asserting 
that a statutory hearing requirement does not prevent the Federal Communications 
Commission from making rules necessary to conduct its business, even if those rules limit 
the number of persons eligible for hearing). 
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request of any person whose interest may be affected.”80 From the very beginning, 
NRC’s predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), interpreted this 
language to require very formal trial-type proceedings, complete with full discovery 
akin to civil procedure and direct and cross-examination for witnesses by the parties’ 
advocates.81 But when new reactor licensing ground to a halt in the 1990s and the 
agency started contemplating license renewals, 82  NRC decided to relax its 
procedures somewhat in hopes of making the proceedings less time-consuming. 
Following a workshop on its hearing procedures, NRC issued a proposed rule that 
took the position that the AEC does not require APA formality.83 Thus, the agency 
significantly dialed back its discovery procedures and discontinued providing cross-
examination as a matter of right; rather, the proponent was required to seek leave to 
cross-examine witnesses and submit a plan for doing so.84   
In its final rule, NRC maintained its key procedural changes but also argued 
that even if APA formality was required, its new procedures met those formality 
standards.85 In Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. United States,86 the First Circuit 
agreed, and rejected the petitioners’ contention that “the magnitude of the risks 
involved in reactor licensing proceedings warrant the imposition of a more elaborate 
set of safeguards.”87 Responding to the petitioners’ argument that the new rules were 
arbitrary and capricious, the court did note that the cross-examination changes were 
a “closer question.”88 The petitioners contended that cross-examination is a critical 
part of such proceedings, because citizens do not normally have resources to call 
their own experts. 89  They argued further that cross-examination furthers public 
confidence in such proceedings.90 Ultimately, however, the court reasoned that the 
remaining availability of cross-examination was sufficient; moreover, for procedural 
rules, “agencies are presumed to have special competence,” and therefore need not 
explain their procedural rules as exactingly as substantive rules.91 Finally, the court 
rejected due process and equal protection challenges: there is no fundamental right 
to participate in reactor licensing proceedings, nor are “citizen-intervenors” a 
“discrete and insular minority.”92 Notably, experience with new reactor licensing 
continues to be marked by opponents’ pushes to reopen proceedings, permit 
                                                 
80 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
81 Citizens Awareness Network, Inc., 391 F.3d at 343. 
82 For context, see Hammond & Spence, supra note 54. 
83 Citizens Awareness Network, Inc., 391 F.3d at 344. 
84 Id. at 344–45. 
85 Id. at 349. 
86 391 F.3d 338 (1st Cir. 2004). 
87 Id. at 349. 
88 Id. at 353. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 353–54. 
92 Id. at 354–55. 
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additional contentions, and generally layer new procedural steps onto the existing 
process.93 
In addition to the general observation that courts typically err on the side of less 
formality, note that Citizen Awareness Network’s logic suggests two additional 
points. First—provided the APA is complied with—courts are indeed deferential to 
agencies’ choices of procedures; the flexibility and resource savings that reduced 
formality provides are permissible reasons for such choices. 94  Indeed, agencies 
occasionally seek and are granted authority from Congress to use informal 
procedures.95 But this leads to the second point. If formal procedures are rare to 
begin with, and courts and agencies alike are resistant to them, why would Congress 
ever impose formality, and what are its normative implications? I turn to those issues 
next.  
 
B.  Formality Through an Oversight and Participation Lens 
 
One potential reason Congress might choose formality stems from the origins 
of the APA itself. If one views the statute as a compromise between conservative 
interests who were worried about overregulation and wanted to slow agencies down 
(hence the inclusion of formal procedures) and liberal interests who believed more 
regulation would adhere to the benefit of a society freshly recovering from the Great 
Depression (hence the informal procedures),96 one could identify the simple reason 
that stricter procedures result in delay.97 
                                                 
93 See, e.g., Blue Ridge Envtl. Def. League v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 716 F.3d 
183, 196–200 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (rejecting numerous challenges to a license proceeding for 
new reactors). 
94 For further discussion of why agencies might choose less formal procedures, see 
STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, 
TEXT, AND CASES 499–502 (6th ed. 2006). 
95 William Funk, Close Enough for Government Work?—Using Informal Procedures 
for Imposing Administrative Penalties, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1993); cf. Federal 
Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2012) (making clear, 
following a court opinion so holding, that the Federal Trade Commission had rulemaking 
authority). 
96 For rich detail, see Kathryn E. Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and Administrative 
Common Law, 90 IND. L.J. 1207, 1224–27 (2015). See also Nielson, supra note 73, at 243–
47 (describing compromise). 
97 See Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 453 (1986); 
Sidney A. Shapiro, A Delegation Theory of the APA, 10 ADMIN. L.J. 89, 98 (1996) 
(concluding that the adoption of the APA “signaled that broad delegations of power and 
combined functions would be tolerated as long as they were checked by more extensive 
procedures”); see also McNollgast, supra note 19, at 181 (“By reducing administrative 
discretion, formal procedures create transaction costs that increase the time and resources 
needed to change policy.”). Note that McNollgast, supra, appears to have been referring here 
to administrative procedures generally, rather than formal procedures governed by sections 
556 and 557 of the APA. 
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This reason makes sense in the context of dread risks. To the extent Congress’s 
intent is to permit risk activities to take place, it would be politically expedient to 
build the check of formal procedures into the regulatory scheme. Further, a closed 
record leaves no doubt as to what the agency considered when it made its decision. 
Thus, it may be easier to exercise legislative oversight where formal procedures are 
used. The use of formal procedures could also be aimed at insulating agencies from 
presidential control. For example, Executive Order 12,866 specifically excludes 
from its coverage “[r]egulations or rules issued in accordance with the formal 
rulemaking provisions of [the APA].” 98  (Adjudications—whether formal or 
informal—are not within the definition of regulation.99) To the extent Congress 
worries about changing executive policies and bureaucratic drift, specifying formal 
procedures might provide at least some protection.100 And formal procedures protect 
against drift in another important way: they insulate against lobbying, because ex 
parte contacts are essentially excluded.101 
But some of these benefits—from a principal/agent perspective—are 
drawbacks for stakeholders. The very requirement of a closed record means that 
contacts with an agency must be conducted in a formalized way, on the record. The 
typical availability of ex parte contacts in informal proceedings—which admittedly 
have a bad reputation for promoting industry capture102—is nevertheless consistent 
with notions of open government. Knowing it may face a remand for failing to 
carefully adhere to the record requirement, an agency is disincentivized from 
engaging with stakeholders informally, outside of the formal strictures of sections 
556 and 557. As a result, stakeholders—particularly individuals who cannot meet 
                                                 
98 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(d)(1), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641 (1994), reprinted as amended 
in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2012); see Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1002 (2011) 
(“[A]gencies retain the ability to take action in forms not subject to review under E.O. 
12,866—formal rulemaking and adjudication.”). 
99 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(d), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 
U.S.C. § 601 (2012). 
100 It is interesting to contemplate whether an agency might strategically choose to 
adopt formal procedures as a means of insulating itself from presidential control. My 
research has not uncovered any examples of this type of behavior. But see Robert V. Percival, 
Who’s in Charge? Does the President Have Directive Authority over Agency Regulatory 
Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2487, 2537–38 (2011) (“Because adjudications cannot be 
the subjects of presidential directive authority under any of the theories that support it, 
agencies can insulate themselves from presidential influence by choosing to set policy 
through adjudication.”). Percival argues this is why the NLRB waited so long to do 
rulemakings. Id.  
101 See Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1536–
37 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that no ex parte contacts are permitted by the president when a 
formal adjudication decision is to be made by specified agency officials); Mark H. 
Grunewald, The NLRB’s First Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 DUKE L.J. 274, 
278–79 (1991). Note there may be less lobbying pressure even under informal adjudication, 
simply because the focus is on one entity rather than an entire industry. 
102 E.g., Wagner et al., supra note 3, at 112. 
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the requirements to be intervenors once an adjudication begins103—are either shut 
out of the process altogether or left to try to navigate a court-like proceeding that 
does not value constructive dialogue so much as adversarial arguments.  
Further, stakeholder oversight is limited in the formal context because meetings 
related to the “initiation, conduct, or disposition” of formal proceedings are exempt 
from the open meetings requirement of the Government in the Sunshine Act.104 The 
rationale for this exemption, according to one court, is that “[t]he evident sense of 
Congress was that when a statute required an agency to act as would a court, its 
deliberations should be protected from disclosures as a court’s would be.”105 To be 
sure, this exclusion makes sense considering the role the agency must perform. But 
it does keep out would-be participants. 
Thus, if the goal is meaningful public participation, we have reasons to be 
skeptical of formal procedures. Notwithstanding the ability of such procedures to 
facilitate judicial and legislative oversight and perhaps guard against drift, their 
participatory drawbacks are numerous. The public-interest push for formality makes 
no sense as a method to promote further engagement. Instead, such efforts truly do 
seem aimed at reducing the ability of regulated entities to take certain kinds of risks 
at all. 
 
IV.  COMPLEXITY AS FORMALITY 
 
It is tempting to think that these tensions within APA formality are not 
particularly worrisome given that such formality is relatively rare. In this section, 
however, I argue that we can conceive of regulatory complexity as a variant of, or 
even a replacement for, traditional APA formality. As described above, dread risks 
are largely managed through mechanisms occurring outside of the formal APA 
framework. Instead, statutory schemes for most dread risks (even those for which 
there is a formal procedural component) involve overlapping, shared, or coordinated 
regulatory responsibility. Moreover, these schemes often involve mixes of 
rulemaking and adjudication, providing a variety of procedural steps for agency 
decision-making. Even so, with complexity comes cost; the challenges faced by 
public-interest groups in directing their resources efficiently have been well 
                                                 
103 This is an additional hurdle for adjudications. See Hammond, supra note 14, at 
1070–71 (illustrating how intervention standards that required science-based contentions can 
be difficult to meet for interested laypeople). 
104 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(10) (2012) (excluding the “initiation, conduct, or disposition by 
the agency of a particular case of formal agency adjudication pursuant to the procedures in 
section 554 of this title . . . .”); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 727 
F.2d 1195, 1196–97 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (permitting closure only of a portion of a meeting that 
concerned formal adjudication connected with restarting an undamaged Three Mile Island 
reactor). 
105 Time, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 667 F.2d 329, 334 (2d Cir. 1981). 
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documented.106 Judicial review, moreover, fails to reinforce participatory values. 
And stakeholders often tend to push for heightened complexity in the face of dread 
risks, undermining once again the participatory goals considered in this Article. This 
Part begins with a brief overview of complexity, noting its general benefits and 
emphasizing its drawbacks specific to participation. Next, I provide examples 
demonstrating how judicial review can undermine participatory norms in this 
context. 
 
A.  Complex Statutory Frameworks 
 
In their invaluable contribution to the literature on shared regulatory space, 
Professors Rossi and Freeman canvass the numerous potential costs and benefits of 
such schemes and present a typology of those schemes.107 Professors Rossi and 
Freeman’s typology ranges from situations where more than one agency is assigned 
the same function, to areas where Congress fails to address a problem that multiple 
agencies must tackle through coordination and expansive interpretations of their 
jurisdictions. In assessing methods of coordination, they note that increasingly 
burdensome procedural requirements correlate with increasingly expensive decision 
costs. 108  Nevertheless, stricter (not necessarily formal) procedures for such 
coordination might ensure that a diversity of expertise is considered by the action 
agency, particularly where that agency’s particular culture would otherwise 
downplay the policy implications of another agency’s expertise.109   
Overall, reasons why Congress may create schemes with fragmented agency 
jurisdiction run from the beneficent to the strategic. For example, overlapping 
regulatory schemes may provide enhanced opportunities for oversight and 
enforcement of regulatory objectives.110 Or they may provide benefits to members 
who wish to take credit for their pet agencies’ good work while avoiding blame by 
pointing to the other agencies’ unpopular actions.111 Finally, duplicative statutory 
                                                 
106 Indeed, it is difficult enough for public interest groups to engage a single agency, as 
described in Wendy Wagner, The Participation-Centered Model Meets Administrative 
Process, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 671, 686–90.  
107 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 22, at 1155–81.  
108 See id. at 1182–83 (noting costs may be offset by benefits of coordination); id. at 
1182 (“[G]iving one agency veto power over another’s decision has the potential to elevate 
costs considerably by sometimes requiring extensive negotiations.”). 
109 Id. at 1182. 
110  Id. at 1135–36 (surveying legal scholarship on these points); Jason Marisam, 
Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 186 (2011) (citing “health agency 
competition and bureaucratic redundancies that guard against regulatory failure”); Anne 
Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing 
Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655, 1657 (2006) (noting the potential 
benefit of agency overlap in providing safeguards and encouraging beneficial agency 
competition). It may also be more difficult for interest groups to capture multiple agencies. 
See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 22, at 1141–43 (collecting sources for this point). 
111 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 22, at 1139–40 (describing public choice theory 
perspective on split delegations). 
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schemes may insulate agencies from presidential control, fight bureaucratic drift, or 
simply be a result of compromise in the political process.112 Thus, such regimes 
share many of the possible motivations for formal procedures, but allow for tailoring 
according to the particular risk domain.  
Sometimes, such regimes can be beneficial for stakeholder participation to the 
extent they provide for informal procedures as a complement to formal procedures. 
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982,113 for example, requires EPA to set standards 
with which DOE must comply as a prerequisite to obtaining a construction or 
operating permit from NRC.114 This process sets up numerous opportunities for 
stakeholder engagement—during EPA’s rulemaking proceeding—even if the formal 
nature of the ultimate licensing proceedings will limit the parties and issues in those 
fora (assuming they ever take place).115 
But here we must confront the difficulties faced by public-interest stakeholders 
even in informal settings, such as notice-and-comment rulemaking. As many 
scholars have noted, participation from these stakeholders has declined in recent 
years.116 Professor Wendy Wagner has neatly summarized the many costs that can 
inhibit participation: those of organizing, obtaining information, and gaining 
access.117 These challenges appear to limit the ability to participate in the first 
place—even for informal rulemakings conducted by a single agency. It stands to 
reason that very complicated regulatory regimes involving shared authority only 
increase the costs of participating. Here, too, they wind up sharing features of formal 
procedures: they are all the more difficult to access, and they are costly.  
                                                 
112 Id. at 1140–42; see O’Connell, supra note 110, at 1704–07 (describing theories 
accounting for agency redundancy and overlap). 
113 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10270 (2012). 
114 For a discussion of the statutory and regulatory scheme governing EPA’s actions 
and judicial review of its actions, see generally Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 
1251 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (striking down portions of EPA-issued rules related to the Yucca 
Mountain nuclear waste disposal site). 
115  Indeed, public-interest groups frequently challenge agencies’ decisions to use 
generic rulemakings rather than separately adjudicate certain issues; presumably, separate 
adjudication provides more opportunities to delay a risky activity. See, e.g., Heckler v. 
Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 470 (1983) (upholding the Social Security Administration’s rules 
establishing uniform standards to reduce the number of issues necessary for a decision in 
adjudications); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 44–45 (1964) (holding 
that a statutory hearing requirement did not preclude an agency from setting statutory 
standards that had the impact of barring would-be applicants from a hearing); New York v. 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 589 F.3d 551, 555 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (upholding 
the NRC decision to undertake generic rulemaking regarding safety risks of spent-fuel 
pools); see also Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Procedure and the 
Decline of the Trial, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 481–82 (2003) (chronicling this development 
as part of a larger trend away from adjudication and toward rulemaking). 
116 E.g., Wagner et al., supra note 3, at 136–41; Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb 
Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. 
Bureaucracy, 68 J. POLITICS 128, 133 (2006). 
117 Wagner, supra note 106, at 681–90. 
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B.  The Limits of Judicial Review 
 
Judicial review is often seen as the answer to some of these problems; much 
administrative law doctrine is aimed at protecting the participatory norms of 
administrative process.118 Occasionally, however, complex agency coordination can 
make it harder to challenge a specific agency’s action. Consider in this regard Gulf 
Restoration Network v. Department of Transportation. 119  This case involved a 
challenge to the Secretary of Transportation’s environmental impact statement (EIS) 
issued in connection with a license to construct a liquefied natural gas port.120 In the 
EIS, the Secretary declined to consider three other proposed liquefied natural gas 
ports, for which draft EISes were not available, in the cumulative effects analysis of 
the document.121 The Secretary’s rationale centered on the speculative nature of the 
three proposed ports—most of which related to the layers of statutory procedure that 
were required before licenses could issue on those other ports.122 For example, the 
Secretary argued that the Deepwater Port Act required “expertise from a number of 
different agencies” as well as “requirements beyond the Secretary’s control,” such 
as the possibility that the EPA or the governor of the relevant state could effectively 
veto a license.123 The court determined that the Secretary had reasonably excluded 
the three ports, acknowledging that a number of contingencies could cancel or 
dramatically alter the license applications.124  
What does this mean for public participation? Piecemeal participation is 
required—increasing the organizational, informational, and access costs of those 
who would participate. This example demonstrates how judicial review can fail to 
incentivize the coordination that would conserve participatory costs.  
Even more dramatically, agencies’ abject failures to promote participatory 
values frequently go unremedied. The saga of chemical weapons incineration 
illustrates. Pursuant to the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1986125 and 
                                                 
118 See Hammond & Markell, supra note 19, at 321–27 (detailing this link). 
119 452 F.3d 362 (5th Cir. 2006). 
120 Id. at 365. 
121 Id. at 369–70. 
122 Id. at 370. 
123 Id. at 370–71, 371 n.17 (noting that after oral argument, the Louisiana Governor did 
in fact veto one of the three excluded ports); see also Fuel Safe Wash. v. Fed. Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n, 389 F.3d 1313, 1324 (10th Cir. 2004) (upholding the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) license for a natural gas pipeline where FERC eliminated 
hypothetical non-natural gas alternatives from its EIS analysis). 
124 Gulf Restoration Network, 452 F.3d at 370–71. The court thereafter extended super 
deference to the Secretary’s substantive determination that the technology to be used in the 
port met the Deepwater Port Act’s environmental criteria. Id. at 368, 371–73. 
125 50 U.S.C. § 1521 (2012). 
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the Chemical Weapons Convention,126 the Army is charged with destroying the 
nation’s stockpile of chemical weapons. The regulatory scheme is complex: in 
addition to complying with the National Environmental Policy Act127 (NEPA), the 
Army must comply with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act128 (RCRA), 
the Clean Air Act129 (CAA), the Toxic Substances Control Act130 (TSCA), and the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know-Act 131  (EPCRA). The 
procedures attached to the statutes provide a number of opportunities for stakeholder 
engagement; however, NEPA has been the focal point for judicial challenges.132 
In the late 1980s, the Army chose on-site incineration as the method of 
destruction—a choice that raised many concerns for the eight communities closest 
to the weapons’ storage locations.133 Following completion of a quantitative risk 
assessment, the Army completed a programmatic EIS selecting on-site 
incineration.134 The Army also completed site-specific EISes for each site at which 
incineration would take place.135 Later, however, the Army decided to use non-
incineration destruction at four of the sites,136 leading to a new round of litigation.  
Sierra Club v. Gates137 provides an example. There, a district court denied 
preliminary injunctive relief to various environmental organizations seeking to 
enjoin rail shipments of a non-incineration chemical weapon destruction byproduct 
                                                 
126 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use 
of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, opened for signature on Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 
U.N.T.S. 317 (entered into force Apr. 29, 1997). 
127 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f (2012). 
128 Id. §§ 6901–6992k. 
129 Id. §§ 7401–7671q. 
130 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (2012). 
131 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,001–11,050 (2012). 
132 It appears that most of the arguments that would be raised under these statutes are 
duplicative of those that would be relevant to a NEPA challenge. See Sierra Club v. Gates, 
499 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1136 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (rejecting claims related to chemical weapons 
derivatives brought under RCRA, the Defense Authorization Act, and state environmental 
statutes because “[t]he Court has already considered these arguments in the context of 
Plaintiffs’ NEPA claims and determined that the scientific basis for the Army’s classification 
is reasonable and sound”). 
133 See Record of Decision; Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, 53 Fed. Reg. 5816, 
5816–17 (Feb. 26, 1988); see also Activity Locations, U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL MATERIALS 
ACTIVITY, http://www.cma.army.mil/map.aspx# [http://perma.cc/H966-SJXE] (last updated 
Sept. 6, 2012) (showing a map of states and regions impacted by chemical weapons 
stockpiles, including the communities of Anniston, Alabama; Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Pueblo, 
Colorado; Newport, Indiana; Lexington, Kentucky; Aberdeen, Maryland; Umatilla, Oregon; 
and Tooele, Utah).  
134 Record of Decision; Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, 53 Fed. Reg. at 5816. 
135 See, e.g., Chem. Weapons Working Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 111 F.3d 
1485, 1487–89 (10th Cir. 1997) (describing this process for the Tooele, Utah site). 
136  This was in response to Congress’s appropriation of additional funds to 
“aggressively pursue alternatives” to incineration at certain sites. S. REP. NO. 103-321, at 
351 (1994). 
137 499 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (S.D. Ind. 2007). 
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from Indiana to Port Arthur, Texas.138 More specifically, the Army destroyed the 
nerve agent VX through hydrolysis, creating the wastewater product CVXH, which 
has corrosive and caustic properties but not nerve agent effects. 139  Among the 
grounds for challenge was the Army’s decision to ship CVXH from Indiana to Port 
Arthur, Texas, and “the apparently short time in which the Government made this 
decision and the lack of transparency to the public in the decision-making 
process.”140 The court agreed “that the lack of transparency in the later part of the 
decision-making process in this case is troubling in light of the goal of NEPA to 
ensure public input into the process,”141 but it nevertheless upheld the Army’s action. 
In finding the decision to ship CVXH not arbitrary or capricious, the court 
pieced together numerous actions from across the record. In 2002, the Army had 
disclosed that it would classify CVXH as hazardous waste and that it would consider 
shipment to an off-site TSDF.142 This action was open to public comment, but the 
only comment was a concern about the type of off-site disposal that might be used.143 
Later, in 2007, the Army announced that shipping was to commence; the relevant 
document explained that the Army would proceed with off-site disposal via 
incineration and concluded that it was not necessary to supplement any previous 
NEPA documents.144 Public input into the actual decision to ship to Texas, however, 
may have occurred after the Army signed a contract with the Texas facility for 
incineration.145 
The petitioners’ challenge focused on the Army’s decision to classify CVXH 
as hazardous waste—a conclusion the court determined was reasonable based on the 
record.146 It appears that the Texas facility had been permitted under the CAA and 
RCRA by the state environmental commission as well as the EPA in 2004.147 
Although the Army had not at that time determined that it would incinerate CVXH 
there, evidence in the record supported the conclusion that there was no need for an 
environmental impact study there because there was no data to suggest the nature of 
the incinerator’s emissions would change.148 Further, the only admissible testimony 
                                                 
138 Id. at 1102–03. 
139 Sierra Club v. Gates, No. 2:07-cv-0101-LJM-WGH, 2008 WL 4368531, at *8 (S.D. 
Ind. Sept. 22, 2008). 
140 Sierra Club, 499 F. Supp. 2d at 1132. 
141 Id. 
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143 Id. 
144 Id. at 1132–33. 
145 Id. at 1133. It appears that there was conflicting evidence in the record as to this fact. 
See Sierra Club v. Gates, No. 2:07-cv-0101-LJM-WGH, 2008 WL 4368531, at *13 (S.D. 
Ind. Sept. 22, 2008) (stating that the Army’s May 18, 2007 Transport Safety Plan was “the 
first time the Army disclosed, in the public portion of the administrative record, that it 
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on this point supported the Army’s decision not to conduct a site-specific EA or 
EIS.149  
Sierra Club v. Gates is instructive for a number of reasons. First, it illustrates 
the way substance and procedure work together for purposes of judicial review 
specific to stakeholder engagement. It seems fair to say that the court engaged in 
hard-look review of the Army’s decisions to classify CVXH as a hazardous waste 
and to ship the waste to the Texas facility for incineration. The court provided a 
detailed description of the historical unfolding of the decision-making process, as 
well as the scientific issues and considerations surrounding the classification of 
CVXH.150 In terms of fulfilling its obligation to provide meaningful substantive 
review, therefore, the court cannot be faulted. But the order also highlights failings 
in vindicating stakeholder engagement: the public was not notified of the decision 
to incinerate at the particular Texas location until after the fact; the record spread 
across years and was difficult to understand; and the incineration facility itself was 
already permitted to handle hazardous waste, meaning the choice of location for this 
particular waste was never really vetted (some might say the opportunity for local 
involvement was short-circuited). And even though the court seemed to agree that 
there were failings in transparency and public participation, this seemed to play no 
role in the court’s analysis.151 
Even when courts directly consider participatory failures, the APA’s standard 
of prejudicial error may prevent full vindication of participatory values. An example 
is suggested by a series of cases involving EPA’s regulation of nitrogen oxides 
(NOx) under the CAA.152 Following a set of remands of the agency’s rules for 
various substantive deficiencies, the agency updated the data in its model for 
determining states’ NOx budgets.153 In its official response to the remands, EPA 
noted that some stakeholders argued that the agency should have undertaken a new 
notice-and-comment rulemaking because it was relying on new data.154 The agency, 
however, thought that because the rule was not vacated on remand and because 
                                                 
149 Id. at 1135. Likewise, the plaintiffs raised an argument about environmental justice 
but did not provide evidence from which the court could conclude that the 2004 permitting 
process by the EPA and Texas environmental commission had not adequately addressed such 
concerns. Id. at 1135–36. In the court’s later order granting summary judgment to the agency, 
it made clear that, because CVXH was classified as a hazardous waste rather than a chemical 
weapon, it “was categorically excluded from those actions that require either an EIS or an 
EA.” Sierra Club, 2008 WL 4368531, at *24. 
150 See Hammond, Super Deference, supra note 19, at 772 (describing the features of a 
hard-look review of agency science). 
151 For further reading, see Victoria R. Danta, Comment, VX in TX: Chemical Weapons 
Incineration and Environmental Injustice in Port Arthur, Texas, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. 
REV. 415, 432–35 (2010). See also Sierra Club, 2008 WL 4368531, at *1 (granting summary 
judgment to the government on the NEPA claims). 
152 The dialogic implications of this case family are explored in Emily Hammond 
Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 1764–
72 (2011). 
153 See id. at 1767–68 (describing the issues and response on remand). 
154 Id. at 1768. 
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stakeholders could comment on the record on remand, a new round of notice-and-
comment was not needed.155  
In the subsequent judicial review, the court in West Virginia v. EPA156 upheld 
the rule both substantively and procedurally.157 Regarding the procedural objection, 
the court agreed that EPA should have undertaken a new notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, but that it was harmless error because the petitioners had not shown that 
such procedures would have made a difference.158 In other words, stakeholders have 
a heavy burden when they challenge participatory errors. And minimal wrist 
slapping—as evidenced in both Sierra Club and West Virginia—can hardly serve as 
an incentive for agencies to reinforce participatory values. 
 
V.  SETTING AN AGENDA 
 
Thus far, I have suggested that formal and complex administrative 
procedures—the latter of which in particular are often directed at dread risks—can 
undermine participation.159 And even assuming regularized participatory processes 
are available, stakeholders may not be able to participate and courts may not fully 
vindicate participation. These problems are only reinforced by risk opponents’ push 
for more procedures. Is there a way forward? Here is where I call for new research 
to tie together the insights from risk theory above with procedural design. This is 
also a call for agencies and stakeholders to do better. 
First, more work is needed to operationalize the insights that the risk literature 
provides—identity affirmation, pluralistic advocacy, and narrative framing160 all 
map onto procedural justice attributes quite nicely.161 But fitting those goals within 
the strictures of the administrative state is the real challenge. This is an area ripe for 
further exploration by legal scholars and social scientists alike. Second, those 
agencies that must follow formal or complex procedures should not hide behind 
those contemplated proceedings and fail to engage stakeholders in other, informal 
ways. Admittedly, this may require a culture shift at some agencies. 
Third, increased reliance on agencies’ regional offices for stakeholder 
engagement may hold value. As Professor David Markell and I discovered in an 
empirical investigation of public stakeholders and EPA at the regional level, 
stakeholders often achieved measurable improvements in state environmental 
regulation when they worked with regional EPA offices.162 We hypothesized that 
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156 West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d 861 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
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159 Informal rulemaking generally faces significant participatory challenges. See Cary 
Coglianese et al., Transparency and Public Participation in the Federal Rulemaking 
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the closer connection between agency personnel and stakeholders may have 
contributed to these outcomes.163 Our study did not focus specifically on dread risks; 
future work could explore whether regional arrangements are of similar utility for 
those types of risks. 
Finally, perhaps it is time to revisit and revise negotiated rulemaking. This 
process was once heralded as a way to better achieve participatory and other 
democratic goals for agency decision-making.164 However, support for the process 
declined dramatically, and it attracted criticisms for subverting the very democratic 
goals it sought to achieve.165 On the other hand, some scholars have suggested it can 
be successful under some conditions; FERC, for example, has used it successfully 
for hydroelectric dam relicensing proceedings.166 And a hint of increased interest 
was evident in the 2015 American Bar Association’s Annual Administrative Law 
Conference: The Renaissance of Reg-Neg? was on the agenda.167 Perhaps, at least 
sometimes, this approach might be useful for dread risks in particular. Certainly, 
further work in this area would be very useful. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Furthering the participatory goals of administrative law by meaningfully 
engaging all varieties of stakeholders is a challenge regardless of the substantive 
area of regulation. But dread risks present even further challenges. Formal 
procedures, complex regulatory schemes, and judicial review undervalue 
participatory values for dread risks, yet risk theory suggests these are the areas in 
which agency procedures are most in need of reform. The project of this Article has 
been to provide some specificity as the foundation for continual improvement. At 
bottom, it is a call for multidisciplinary approaches to furthering meaningful 
participation in an effort to improve regulatory decision-making. 
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